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Lessig: The Lesson Patterson Taught

THE LESSON PATTERSON TAUGHT
Lawrence Lexsig*
I only met Lyman Ray Patterson once. I know his work in one area only, and
I have only known that work well in the past five years. Yet of all the scholars I
have ever known, there is no one who has had a more significant influence on my
own view of the area of law to which my work is now devoted.
Patterson, I expect, would have called that area of law "copyright." I would
callit constitutional copyright. For Patterson's work, more than any other scholar
in the field of copyright, shows a certain practice of constitutional law. It is
neither an uncontroversial practice among constitutional law scholars nor has it
ever been uncontroversially advanced. But it is the practice of law that in my own
view best exemplifies what a constitution can be, and Patterson's own practice
demonstrates best how a scholar can contribute to the best of what a constitution
could be.
This practice is a kind of fidelity in interpretation.' Its aim is to preserve the
meaning of a constitutional text across radically different interpretive context.
And though constitutional scholarship rarely turns its attention upon the Progress
Clause 2 of our Constitution, the meaning of that clause within our tradition will
become increasingly important to those who believe fidelity should be our first
constitutional practice. To do this work of fidelity well, a lawyer must understand
the context from which a text is drawn. Yet as few lawyers ever do, and as even
fewer do well, to understand an original context well, one must understand it as
those who lived it would. Philosophers teach us that it is impossible to do that
perfectly. But for reasons I can only sketch here, Patterson's work shows it can
still be done well.
The lesson that Patterson taught was that we had become far removed from
the "copyright" that our framers had established. This drift has happened slowly,
and it parallels a drift that Mark Rose describes among the British as well.3 Rose
describes the slow forgetting over sixty years; Patterson's story spans the life of
our Republic. By the time he wrote his extraordinary book, Copyright in Historical
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See Lawrence Lessig, Undrslanin&gChangedReading: Fidek' and Theoy, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395

(1995) (proposing a theory to explain how new readings of the Constitution may maintain fidelity
with past understandings of the document's meaning and purpose).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3 MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS 92-93 (1993).
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Perspective,4 in 1968, the law of copyright had already forgotten its roots. Indeed,
it had already become precisely what our framers had intended to avoid.
Our framers had inherited a tradition that resolved through law one of the
most important struggles about how knowledge and culture would develop.
Power over culture and over the flow of knowledge should be limited. This was
consistent with constitutional law in the Anglo-American tradition generally. As
Professor Marci Hamilton has written,' our Republic would allow no centralized
church to get its power through law; neither would it allow any centralized
government to exert unlimited power through the law; and nor would it allow any
centralized authority over culture and knowledge to gain its power through law.
In each case, the framers' aim was not to destroy a power but to limit it. And in
each case, the technique by which that power was limited was grounded in the
Constitution. State religions were allowed, but the Establishment Clause 6 forbid
a federal religion; federal power was established, but it was limited by federalism;
and a legal right to control the spread of knowledge and culture was granted, but
that power was restricted by the very clause that established it.
We had inherited the technique of that limit from the British. After decades
of suffering a censoring press, the British were the first to expressly limit the
power the law might grant those who controlled the press-booksellers. This
was the Statute of Anne of 1710, 7 which secured the right of authors and
booksellers to an exclusive property interest in a book once published, but limited
that property interest to a fixed term. From our perspective, this looks like a
simple recognition of an author's right. And against the background of a very
vague understanding of Locke's labor theory of value, it seems right to us that our
framers, and the British before them, would have recognized so fundamental a
property interest as the right of an author over the product of his mind.
But Patterson's first lesson is that these laws granting authors power were not
the expression of a natural right, but were instead industrial regulation. They
responded to a particular danger of concentration within the industry that gave
access to knowledge and culture-publishing. And both the British and
American versions of this power were architected to avoid those dangers through
structural limits on the ability of publishers' power to concentrate.
The British had one innovation in the design of that limit; the Americans had
two. At the time of the Statute of Anne, the nature of literary property was

LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968).

s Marci Hamilton, The Histoical and Philosophical Underpinnings of the Copyright Clause, 5
OCCASIONAL PAPERS INTELL. PROP. FROM BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO ScH. L., YESHIVA U. (1999).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (1710) (Eng.).
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uncertain.' Some believed that it was protected by the common law; some
believed it had no natural protection at all. But whatever its status, everyone
recognized the power of publishers. After almost two centuries of intimate
conspiracy with the Crown, publishers had become a powerful and protected
force over the spread of knowledge and culture. A small group of London
Publishers-the Conger-exercised vast control over the progress of English
culture.9 Their claimed monopolies over the right to publish books meant that
the spread of books would forever be restricted by the peculiar economics of a
monopolist.
The ideals of the Enlightenment chafed at this result. Concentrated power
over the spread of knowledge was not how society would progress. Yet a
practical recognition of the political power of the publishers led reformers to find
an indirect way to limit the booksellers' power. In Britain, that was the limit on
terms. A copyright would be secured under British law to "authors and
booksellers" but only for a fixed term, after which the exclusive right to publish
a particular work would expire, and once that protection expired, the spread of
knowledge within Britain would be determined by the dynamics of a competitive
market.
It is from such particular examples that the Madisons of our tradition learned
best how to limit government generally. For the technique of the Statute of Anne
was to avoid a conflict with a dangerous power by building a structure that would
check the emergence of that power. By assuring that any monopoly right over the
spread of knowledge would be limited, the British guaranteed that eventually,
competition would govern the progress of knowledge. Successful and important
works would be produced within a competitive market, after the term of exclusive
protection expired. That competition would check any trend to concentration.
Yet such a purpose could not have been achieved if it had been pursued
directly. The booksellers were too powerful, and their claim to a natural right was
too strong. Thus, the framers of this structure of Madisonian balance put off the
liberation of British culture for a generation as a way to buy the promise that
eventually that limit would be effected. A compromise within Parliament limiting
the term of a copyright was possible because the limits were deferred for twentyone years. The booksellers were not happy with the limit. But neither were they
happy with the absence of any express legal authority for their exclusive
rights-which had expired with the Licensing Act in 1695.10 Thus, they accepted

a 1 WILLIAM

W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE

UNITED STATES 477 (1953) ("[Tihe Common Law of the United States... was in a highly uncertain
state on the subject of copyrights.").
9 PATrERSON, supra note 4, at 151-52.
'0 Brief Amici Curiae ofTyler T. Ochoa et al. at 6, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No.
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a compromise that secured their rights immediately and left to another day the
question of whether their secured rights would ever expire.
When their rights did begin to expire, the booksellers returned to Parliament
to ask for extensions. Indeed, three times did the booksellers make the plea that
their exclusive rights over their books should be continued," but Parliament three
times rejected their claim. In 1774, after a generation of uncertainty, the House
of Lords finally recognized that whatever rights the common law granted the
bookseller or author over works published to the world, those rights were now
defined by the Statute of Anne. 2 Hence, those rights would expire. After the
decision in Donaldson v. Beckett," and for the first time in British history, the works
of Shakespeare and Milton were free of the booksellers' control. A free market
would thereafter fuel the spread of culture. It is was this "free culture" that we
Americans inherited.
The Americans added one idea to the innovation of the Statute of
Anne-"Authors." Not only would the monopolies granted under the law be
limited in term, but they would also be granted to authors alone. "Booksellers"
would have no direct right under American law to control the exclusive right to
publish that copyright law would grant. 4 Any right they did have would be
granted indirectly from authors alone. As the source of this monopoly protection
was therefore the many who would be authors, the concentration of this
monopoly right would again be checked.
To see constitutional purpose in the framers' design required the work of a
historian. This was Patterson's genius. Indeed, after two hundred years of regular
copyright law, our tradition had lost touch with the ideals that animated its
founding. We had forgotten that the law was first a regulation of publishers."5
More importantly, we had lost any sense of limit to the rights that the law did
grant. What was born as a tiny and particular right-the exclusive right in authors
to control the "publishing" of a "map, chart, or book" for a term of fourteen
years, renewable once' 6-had become a massive and general right to control not
just the publishing, but increasingly, the uses of creative property. America was
founded during the first struggle over the nature of creative property; we aligned
ourselves through our Constitution with the side in that struggle that viewed
copyright as regulation; yet two hundred years after that founding, the rights
granted under that regulation had grown so extensively that most view the

01-618).
'

at 7-8.

12 Donaldson

v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774).

L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, andFairUse, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1987).
s Id at 16.
Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
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regulation as the recognition of a natural right. When Patterson published his
extraordinary book, copyright had already become precisely what the framers had
sought to avoid-an essentially perpetual power exercised by increasingly
concentrated few to control the access to, and the spread of, knowledge and
culture.
Yet when Patterson demonstrated this truth, there was little reason to listen.
However powerful publishers had become, there was a regular practice of the
culture they affected that was still balanced and free. In 1968, the economics of
publishing kept prices generally low. The spread of the market assured wide
access to any culture and knowledge that was produced, and a strong system of
public libraries tempered the limits that remained. Once published, however long
the term of control had become, creative work passed quite quickly into the
competitive market of used bookstores and the subsidized market of libraries.
The fiscal costs of this control were therefore tempered. So too were the
opportunity costs. While the expanse of rights protected by copyright had grown
dramatically in 180 years since our founding, the economics of publishing assured
that any burden created by these rights would fall on those best able to bear that
burden. Thus, derivative rights were unknown to our framers; yet the industries
that would be necessary to exercise those derivative rights were quite capable of
negotiating any burden that those rights imposed.
Thus as the time Patterson gave legal culture the gift of his work, the
significance of his insight was not immediately apparent. An industry had grown
up around a different conception of copyright, and it was not obvious what would
be gained by returning to the framers' very different vision. Patterson was
therefore promoting a truth without a constituency. He had identified a
fundamental and unnoticed change, but it was not at all clear that anything had
been lost in this compromise of principle.
In the thirty-five years since Patterson first remarked this change, the change
has only grown more significant. In the last decade especially, the opportunity
costs of this change have finally been realized. Copyright law has only become
more extreme in its protections. Technology has finally made the costs of this
extremism significant. For just at the time when the ideals that the framers
imagined could be realized-when a technology for spreading culture cheaply and
broadly has developed, and an opportunity for an astonishingly wide range of
creativity has been produced-the burdens of this unchecked expanse of
regulation called copyright now choke the very values that it was set to protect.
The burdens of this law-in its scope and complexity-limit the opportunity for
follow-on creators freely to cultivate our culture; those burdens in turn drive
industries to concentration. Both trends have resulted in a culture that is more
heavily regulated and controlled through law than at any time in our past.
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Patterson's truth thus now has a constituency. There is now a movement that
would translate his insights about the values of our framers into law once again.
Yet so far have we strayed from the values they thought important such that it is
practically impossible to even excite recognition.
In my own work, I have felt this gap most directly. It was upon the basis of
Patterson's understanding of our framers' values that some of us launched a
constitutional challenge on the latest example of Congress's forgetting.17 The
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act"s was perhaps the most extreme
instance of copyright forgotten. For the eleventh time in forty years, Congress,
through CTEA, had extended the terms of existing copyrights. This time the
extension was for twenty years. The quid pro quo that our framers had
envisioned between the grant of a monopoly and the creation of something new
was forgotten. 9 The value of a competitive market to spread culture was delayed,
and the dangers of increasing concentration in the right to cultivate our past were
totally ignored. Indeed, precisely the opposite idea guided many in granting this
latest extension-that it was a value to assure that our culture remain within the
control of those who could be counted upon to develop it "best. '2
Thus, in our appeal to the Supreme Court to strike this latest extension, our
focus was upon the framers' values. We asked the Court to interpret the
Constitution's grant of powers against the background that scholars such as
Patterson had painted. We asked the Court to make sense of the peculiar and
limited grant of authority in light of those values. We asked, in a word, for
restoration of those values by limiting at least this most extreme example of
copyright unmoored from its founding ideals.
Yet even among the Justices for whom fidelity to our framers' values is the
first virtue of constitutional law, the lesson was lost. In its decision upholding the
CTEA, the Court did not even try to explain the odd structure of Congress's
grant of power. Its history is limited to the post-ratification history of periodic
deference to Congress. The Court was asked to reaffirm the values of the
framers, but its opinion shows no recognition of those values at all.
Were Patterson's a story written in Hollywood, ironically, it would have had
a different ending. The man whose work gave birth to a movement would have
had the chance, in his last days, to see that movement bear fruit. Yet the tempo

1 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
laSonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
19

Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Impied limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property

Clause as an Absolute Constrainton Congess, 2000 U. ILL. L.REV. 1119 (2000).
' Brief of Amici Curiae Dr. Seuss Enters. et al. at 19, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
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of constitutional law knows no metronome of dramatic climax. It works its pace

on its own.
There will be a time soon when our tradition will confront again the conflict
between the value of free culture that our framers gave us, and the very different
values that now guild the regulation of speech we call copyright. That confrontation was avoided in Eldred v. Ascoft. It cannot be avoided forever. When our
tradition resolves this question again, the lessons of this teacher from the
University of Georgia School of Law will Finally have their proper effect. We
have lost touch with ideals that were central to our founding. The work of this
extraordinary scholar will guide their rediscovery.
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